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Ordeal Mechanisms, Information and the Cost-effectiveness of 
Subsidies: Evidence from Subsidized Eyeglasses in Rural China 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
  The cost-effectiveness of programs providing goods and services for free 
or at subsidized prices is often compromised by the fact that many individuals do 
not use the goods provided. Many goods, such as insecticide-treated mosquito 
nets (Cohen and Dupas, 2010), water purification technologies (Ashraf et al., 
2010; Dupas, 2014), improved cookstoves (Miller and Mobarak, 2013) and 
eyeglasses (Glewwe et al., 2012), for example, require active use for benefits to 
be realized. Low utilization rates, even after goods have been acquired, imply that 
subsidies are often wasted on goods that go unused. Moreover, the 
cost-effectiveness of subsidization programs can also be undermined if subsidies 
displace pre-existing demand at market prices. 
The cost-effectiveness of subsidization programs can be improved by (a) 
targeting to individuals most likely to use them and least likely to purchase them 
at market prices (on the extensive margin); and (b) increasing usage among those 
acquiring a good (on the intensive margin). Although it has been argued that 
charging a positive price (or “cost-sharing”) can accomplish both tasks, empirical 
evidence suggests that charging even a modest price for some products can 
significantly dampen demand and screen out a significant number of individuals 
who would otherwise use the products had they been provided for free, thus 
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compromising the primary policy goal of increasing usage (Cohen and Dupas, 
2010; Ashraf et al., 2010).1 
In this paper, we explore two non-price policy approaches aimed at 
improving the cost-effectiveness of programs providing goods for free with the 
ultimate goal of increasing usage. The first approach, applying a so-called ordeal 
mechanism to product distribution, aims to improve cost-effectiveness by 
targeting products to individuals who will use the product (Dupas et al., 2013). 
The second approach, providing information through an information campaign, 
attempts to increase usage among recipients of the product by addressing 
misinformation that contributes to low rates of use. Through a field experiment in 
which we distributed eyeglasses to myopic children in rural China, we test the 
impact of these two approaches on uptake, overall use and cost-effectiveness. 
Because subsidies and information (or social marketing) campaigns are 
commonly implemented simultaneously (Ashraf et al., 2013), we also test how the 
effects of an ordeal and information interact. 
Although traditionally used to target government transfers, such as welfare 
and unemployment (Nicols et al., 1971; Nicols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Besley and 
Coate, 1992; Alatas et al., 2013), ordeal mechanisms have more recently been 
examined as a way to distribute subsidized goods in developing countries (see 
Dupas et al., 2013). Ordeal mechanisms attempt to encourage targeted individuals 
to self-select into programs by requiring that applicants undergo an ordeal, such 
as a time-consuming application procedure or traveling to redeem a voucher.2 In 
the case of subsidized goods, imposing an ordeal for individuals to acquire the 
                                                
1 In addition to screening out those unlikely to use a product, charging a price may increase use 
through sunk-cost effects (the psychological effect whereby individuals are more likely to use a 
good because they paid for it, independent of the intrinsic welfare the good brings—Thaler, 1980) 
or by signaling that a product is high quality. There is little evidence, however, that cost-sharing 
increases utilization (Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Ashraf et al., 2010). 
2 Note that although vouchers are in fact a relatively common way of distributing subsidized 
goods – such as agricultural input subsidies, for example (Jayne and Rashid, 2013) – we are aware 
of no studies that examine these policies as a self-selection mechanism.   
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product can improve program cost-effectiveness by selecting in individuals who 
would likely use a good and selecting out individuals unlikely to use a good, as 
well as those more likely to purchase a good at market prices (Dupas et al., 
2013).3 A potential cost of ordeal mechanisms, however, is that (similar to price 
instruments) they can screen out individuals who would have otherwise used the 
product. If the ordeal mechanism reduces access to those that would have 
otherwise used a product, then it could be counter-productive to the policy goal of 
increasing overall use. Moreover, because ordeal mechanisms work by imposing a 
deadweight loss, social cost-effectiveness may not improve if this loss is not 
compensated by a reduction in non-users acquiring a good. 
While an ordeal mechanism can improve cost-effectiveness through 
targeting, providing information about a good through an information campaign 
can improve cost-effectiveness by increasing the rate or intensity of usage among 
recipients of the product. Applied to experience goods, providing information on 
the true benefits of a good can increase uptake when beneficiaries either have 
little prior information or have priors that undervalue a good (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2011). Information campaigns also can increase uptake by reducing 
the perceived or real costs of using a good, for example by reducing stigma 
associated with product use (Brent, 2010). Apart from providing new information 
about a good, a second way information campaigns may increase uptake is by 
increasing the salience of a good—a potentially important channel if low 
                                                
3 While the objective of applying an ordeal mechanism to the distribution of a subsidized product 
is to target individuals based on perceived benefit, traditional ordeal mechanisms applied to 
transfer programs target individuals based on cost. Because the utility cost imposed by the ordeal is 
different for the rich than the poor because poor people may be more liquidity-constrained but less 
time-constrained than the rich, requiring that applicants undergo such an ordeal can deter the 
relatively wealthy from applying for benefits thus reserving government resources for the needy. In 
the case of transfers, ordeal mechanisms have been shown to be both cheaper (eliminating the need 
for costly or impossible collection of data needed for means testing, for example) and lead to more 
efficient targeting (Alatas et al., 2013). 
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utilization is driven by limited attention rather than lack of knowledge (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2011). 
Given that the effectiveness of the ordeal mechanism in screening out the 
“right” individuals depends on perceptions of the benefits and costs of using a 
product at different points in time, a simultaneous information campaign aimed at 
changing these perceptions could have important effects on the performance of 
the ordeal. For instance, an information campaign may induce more individuals to 
undertake an ordeal to acquire a good; however, cost-effectiveness will be 
reduced if these individuals do not also subsequently use the good acquired. 
Moreover, if an information campaign has a greater effect on ex-post usage than 
on uptake under an ordeal mechanism, an ordeal may screen out individuals who 
would have used a good if they had the good and were also informed.  
Through a large-scale field experiment involving 252 schools in rural 
China, we study the effects of an ordeal mechanism and information campaign in 
the context of a program distributing eyeglasses to myopic school children. We 
first randomly assigned schools to one of three distribution groups: a Free 
Delivery group in which eyeglasses were delivered to schools; an Ordeal group in 
which students and their family members were required to travel to the local 
county seat to redeem vouchers for otherwise free glasses; and a standard of care 
control or Market group in which students were only given eye examinations and 
a prescription to obtain eyeglasses in the existing eyeglass market. Half of the 
schools within each of these distribution groups were then randomly allocated to 
receive an Information Campaign. Through this experimental design, we compare 
the effects of each type of distribution scheme, and their interaction with 
information, on eyeglass ownership and use in the short term (one month after 
initial distribution) and long term (seven months after initial distribution).  
A program to distribute subsidized eyeglasses is a useful setting to study 
the questions that we address for at least five reasons. First, uncorrected refractive 
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errors (such as myopia) represent a substantial burden in developing countries, 
generally, and in China, in particular (Maul et al., 2000; Murthy et al., 2002; He et 
al., 2007; Resnikoff et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2014). Second, even though eyeglasses 
can fully correct vision loss due to myopia, they are utilized at low rates in 
developing countries—likely due to a lack of information (Li et al., 2010; Yi et al., 
2015), misinformation (Congdon et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010), or stigma (Castanon 
Holguin et al., 2006; Odedra et al., 2008). Third, like many health products, 
eyeglasses are an experience good whose use is subject to both positive and 
negative learning. Experiential learning may be particularly important in 
determining demand in places where the quality of medical advice is low, such as 
rural China (Fischer et al., 2014; Bai et al., 2014; Sylvia et al., 2015). Fourth, 
because eyeglasses are generally able to fully correct reduced vision due to 
myopia, an individual’s degree of myopia prior to the program provides an 
indicator for each individual’s potential welfare improvement from the use of 
eyeglasses, a convenient feature for analyzing cost-effectiveness. Finally, from a 
policy perspective, eyeglasses are costly to provide at scale, warranting the 
development of strategies to improve the cost-effectiveness of their provision. 
We emphasize two main findings. First, without the information campaign, 
requiring an ordeal modestly improved targeting efficiency. The ordeal selected 
out approximately 12% of individuals that would not have used glasses if freely 
distributed to students at schools. The use of eyeglasses (as measured though 
unannounced visits to schools) was as high in ordeal schools as in the free 
delivery schools suggesting that no individuals were selected out by the ordeal 
who would have used eyeglasses if freely delivered. Seven months after the initial 
distribution, “effective coverage” (defined as usage unconditional on ownership 
(Cohen and Dupas, 2010)) was approximately 12 percentage points higher in the 
Ordeal and Free Delivery groups relative to the Market group (an increase of 
nearly 30 percent). 
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Second, the information campaign was effective in increasing usage when 
glasses were freely delivered, yet had no effect on usage when glasses were 
distributed through an ordeal mechanism or when individuals needed to purchase 
eyeglasses in the market. Providing information increased usage in the free 
distribution group by approximately 19 percentage points in the short-term and 8 
percentage points in the long-term follow-up. We find evidence that the 
information campaign was most effective in combination with free delivery due 
(at least in part) to two related effects: (a) the ordeal mechanism selected out of 
eyeglass ownership those who would be most responsive to information if 
eyeglasses had been freely delivered; and (b) undergoing an ordeal mechanism 
had a salience effect on ex-post use which was a substitute for the effect of the 
information campaign. 
Taking these effects together, our results at seven months after the initial 
distribution show that free delivery with the information campaign achieved the 
highest overall rate of effective coverage out of the policy options examined. 
Moreover, this combination of interventions was the most cost-effective, both in 
terms of “programmatic” costs (implementation costs) and social costs that 
account for deadweight loss due to the ordeal. Given the patterns of use that we 
find, the ordeal would have had to screen out approximately 48 percent more 
individuals without reducing the overall rate of use in order to be as cost-effective 
as free delivery with information. Requiring an ordeal costly enough achieve this 
level of screening, though, would likely impose a deadweight loss large enough to 
fully offset gains from improved targeting. We stress, however, that this specific 
pattern of results is likely to be context dependent and hinge in particular on the 
elasticity of voucher redemption with respect to time costs, the initial knowledge 
of the good in the target population, as well as the learning attributes of the good 
being subsidized (the potential for positive and negative learning through product 
use (see e.g., Fischer et al., 2014)). 
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Our findings contribute to the literature on the subsidized distribution of 
goods in developing countries. The majority of this literature has focused on how 
pricing affects demand and subsequent use and uptake (Cohen and Dupas, 2010; 
Ashraf et al., 2010; Dupas, 2014; Tarozzi et al., 2014; Fischer et al., 2014). By 
examining how distribution through an ordeal mechanism affects these outcomes, 
our findings build most directly on the findings of Dupas et al. (2013) who 
examine the effects of a “micro-ordeal” in the distribution of chlorine solution for 
water treatment in Kenya. Dupas et al. (2013) find that requiring households to 
redeem monthly coupons for free chlorine effectively targets chlorine to those 
who will use it. They use these results to illustrate that having the policy option of 
a micro-ordeal dramatically expands the set of parameter values for which a social 
planner would prefer full subsidization over partial subsidization.  
We build on Dupas et al. (2013) in three main ways. First, we corroborate 
their initial findings on the screening effects of an ordeal in the context of a very 
different type of experience good. This is important because the effects of 
distribution and pricing policies could depend a great deal on product 
characteristics. Second, we find evidence that ordeal mechanisms can increase use 
through a salience effect. Our third contribution is our finding that the 
performance the ordeal mechanism relative to free delivery depends on the 
information provided about the good and that free delivery dominates an ordeal 
mechanism in terms of effective coverage and cost-effectiveness when combined 
with information. This third contribution is also related to Ashraf et al. (2013), 
who find that providing information significantly increases the impact of price 
subsidies on purchases of water treatments.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides 
background on the research context regarding uncorrected refractive errors among 
school-aged children in rural China. Section 3 describes the experiment and data 
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collection. Section 4 discusses the main results for eyeglass acquisition and usage. 
Section 5 presents cost-effectiveness calculations. The final section concludes. 
 
II. Uncorrected Refractive Errors: Prevalence, Consequences and Policy 
Approaches 
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 285 million people 
are visually impaired, 90 percent of whom live in developing countries (Pascolini 
and Mariotti, 2012). The main cause of visual impairment is uncorrected 
refractive errors which accounts for 43 percent of the total burden. Approximately 
10-15 percent of school-aged children in developing countries have vision 
problems due primarily to myopia (Maul et al., 2000; Murthy et al., 2002; He et 
al., 2007; Resnikoff et al., 2008). With minor exceptions, visual impairment in 
children can be fully corrected by the timely and proper fitting eyeglasses (Esteso 
et al., 2007; Ma et al., 2015); however, numerous studies in developing countries 
document exceedingly low rates of eyeglass use (Bourne et al., 2004; Ramke et al., 
2007). 
The prevalence of uncorrected refractive errors among children in rural 
China is among the highest in the world (He et al., 2004; He et al., 2007). Recent 
studies show that about 25% of primary school students have myopia (Yi et al., 
2015) but less than one fifth of myopic children own eyeglasses (Ma et al., 2014; 
Zhou et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015).4 Only half of the children owning glasses 
regularly wear them (Yi et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015).  
The costs of uncorrected refractive errors are high, particularly among 
school-aged children. Beyond generally impairing quality of life, uncorrected 
refractive errors can reduce productivity and can hamper performance at school 
                                                
4 Ma et al (2014) and Zhou et al (2014) find that only 16 percent of students in rural public 
schools in Shaanxi and Gansu who are myopic own glasses; Wang et al. (2015) find a similar rate 
(18 percent) in Shanghai migrant schools. 
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(Resnikoff et al., 2008). Providing children with eyeglasses through school-based 
programs has been shown to significantly improve their academic performance, 
having effects on par with education interventions deemed highly successful 
(Glewwe et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2014). In a context such as China—where 
academic performance in early years is especially critical to gaining access to 
subsequent higher quality educational opportunities—there are potentially 
substantial long-term benefits of the early correction of myopia. 
Previous research has highlighted several factors contributing to the low 
utilization of eyeglasses among school children despite these large potential 
benefits. Lack of vision screening and the affordability of eyeglasses given 
liquidity constraints are likely significant barriers (Resnikoff et al., 2008). In 
China, many children are unaware they are visually impaired (Li et al., 2010; Yi 
et al., 2015) and eyeglasses are a large expense in poor rural areas.5 But even in 
countries where there is routine screening and eyeglasses are freely provided, 
compliance can remain low; suggesting that other factors—such as 
misinformation and stigma—may also play a role (Resnikoff et al., 2008).  
Misinformation has been highlighted as a major reason for low utilization 
among children in rural China (Li et al., 2010; Yi et al., 2014). There is a common 
misconception, for example, that wearing eyeglasses further deteriorates vision, 
likely a result of the correlation between eyeglass use and deteriorating eyesight. 
It is also commonly believed that eye exercises can prevent and treat myopia, 
despite any opthamological basis or evidence on their efficacy (Li et al., 2015).6 
Interestingly, stigma appears to be a relatively minor issue in our sample based on 
                                                
5 Data from our baseline survey showed that among children who owned glasses, the median price 
paid was approximately $55. This represents a large portion of the average (as of 2011) $130 
monthly income for rural families in China (China National Statistics Bureau, 2012). 
6 In our baseline survey, around 75% of parents report that they believe wearing eyeglasses will 
deteriorate one’s vision. Around 55% believe that eye exercises can effectively treat myopia. 
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baseline student responses to questions about teasing. Only 15 percent of students 
that wore glasses regularly reported that they had been teased.  
If lack of awareness and liquidity constraints are, in fact, significant 
barriers, providing eye screenings and subsidized eyeglasses may be effective 
policy approaches to address low utilization. If eyeglasses are subject to positive 
learning once acquired, even a one-off subsidy may be sufficient to significantly 
increase long-run use (Dupas, 2014). However, eye screening and subsidies alone 
may be ineffective if there are significant barriers to uptake and use in the form of 
misinformation, stigma, or limited attention to eye health. A common approach to 
addressing these types additional barriers is through information (or social 
marketing) campaigns. 
 
III. Experimental Design and Data Collection 
 
A. Sampling 
Our experiment took place in two adjoining provinces of western China: Shaanxi 
and Gansu.7 In each of the provinces, one prefecture (each containing a group of 
seven to ten counties) was included in the study. In each prefecture, we obtained a 
list of all rural primary schools. To minimize the possibility of inter-school 
contamination, we first randomly selected 252 townships and then randomly 
selected one school per township for inclusion in the experiment. Within schools, 
our data collection efforts (discussed below) focused on 4th and 5th grade students. 
From each grade, one class was randomly selected and surveys and visual acuity 
examinations were given to all students in these classes. 
 
                                                
7  Shaanxi’s GDP per capita of USD 6108 was ranked 14th among China’s 31 provincial 
administrative regions in 2012, and was very similar to that for the country as a whole (USD 6091) 
in the same year, while Gansu was the second-poorest province in the country (per capita GDP 
USD 3100) (China National Statistics Bureau, 2012). 
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B. Experimental Design 
Following the baseline survey and vision tests, schools were randomly 
assigned to one of the six cells in the 3 by 2 experimental design shown in Table 
1.8 Schools were first randomized into one of three distribution groups: Free 
Delivery, Ordeal or Market (or control). Half of the schools assigned to each 
distribution group were then assigned to receive an additional Information 
Campaign. To improve power, we stratified the randomization by county and by 
the number of children in the school found to need eyeglasses. In total, this 
yielded a total of 45 strata. Our analysis takes this randomization procedure into 
account (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). 
The three distribution groups were as follows: 
Free Delivery: In the Free Delivery group each student diagnosed with 
myopia was given a free pair of eyeglasses as well as a letter to their parents 
informing them of their child’s prescription.9 The child was permitted to select a 
pair of frames, which were then fit to the proper prescription and delivered to 
students at schools by a team of one optometrist and two enumerators.   
Ordeal: In the Ordeal group, each student diagnosed with myopia was 
given a voucher as well as a letter to their parents informing them of their child’s 
prescription. Their prescription was also printed in the voucher. This voucher was 
redeemable for one pair of free glasses at an optical store that was in the county 
seat.10 To a large extent, the ordeal is simply the cost (in transportation fare and 
time) associated with travel to this optical shop. The distance from each student’s 
home village and the county seat varied a great deal within our sample, ranging 
from 1 kilometer to 105 kilometers with a mean distance of 33 kilometers. The 
                                                
8 After the baseline survey, one of the 252 schools was found to have no children requiring glasses 
and was excluded from the randomization. The final sample therefore includes 251 schools. 
9 More than 95% of poor vision is due to myopia. The rest is due to hyperopia and astigmatism. 
For simplicity, we will use myopia to refer to vision problems more generally.  
10 Program eyeglasses were pre-stocked with one chosen optometrist per county. 
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vouchers were non-transferable. Information identifying the student, including 
his/her name, school and county, was printed on each voucher and students were 
required to present their identification in person to redeem the voucher.  
Market: Myopic students in the Market group were given a letter to their 
parents informing them of their child’s myopia status and prescription.   
In each of these three provision groups, half of the schools were randomly 
assigned to receive an information campaign: 
Information Campaign: The Information Campaign included three 
components. First, a short documentary-type film was shown to students in 
classes. Second, students were given a set of cartoon-based pamphlets in classes. 
Finally, parents and teachers attended a meeting at the school in which they were 
shown the film and additional handouts were distributed. Each component of the 
Information Campaign addressed the benefits of wearing glasses and provided 
information meant to address common misconceptions that lead to inflated 
perceptions of use costs and contribute to low adoption rates. The Information 
Campaign specifically addressed the misconceptions that wearing glasses 
deteriorates vision and that eye exercises can cure myopia.  
 
C. Data Collection 
Baseline Survey and Eye Examination  
A baseline survey was conducted in September 2012. The baseline survey 
collected detailed information on schools, students and households. The school 
survey collected information on school infrastructure and characteristics 
(including distance to county seat). A student survey was given to all students in 
selected 4th and 5th grade classes. This student survey collected information on 
basic background characteristics of students and their knowledge of vision health. 
Students were also asked about their pre-program experience with eyeglasses, 
including whether they owned eyeglasses, if they regularly wore their eyeglasses, 
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their experience in wearing eyeglasses if they wore them (were they teased) and 
what their reasons were for not wearing eyeglasses if they did not. Household 
surveys were also given to these same students, which they took home and filled 
out with their parents. The household survey collected information on households 
(e.g., parents’ education levels; the value of family assets) that children would 
likely have difficulty answering, as well as information on parents’ knowledge 
and perceptions of eye problems and the use of eyeglasses.  
At the same time as the school survey, a two-step eye examination was 
administered to all students in the randomly selected classes in all sample schools. 
First, a team of two trained staff members administered visual acuity screenings 
using Early Treatment Diabetic Retinopathy Study (ETDRS) eye charts. 11 
Students who failed the visual acuity screening test (cutoff is defined by VA of 
either eye less than or equal to 6/12, or 20/40) were enrolled in a second vision 
test that was carried out at each school 1-2 days after the first test. This second 
vision test was conducted by a team of one optometrist, one nurse and one staff 
assistant and involved cycloplegic automated refraction with subjective 
refinement to determine prescriptions for children needing glasses.12 After being 
fitted with eyeglasses, corrected visual acuity (with eyeglasses) was tested again 
to make sure both eyes could be improved to 6/12.  
 
Acquisition and Use of Eyeglasses 
Our analysis focuses on two key variables: eyeglass ownership and use. 
Acquisition is defined by ownership, i.e., a binary variable taking value of one if a 
student owns a pair of eyeglasses at baseline or acquired one during the program 
                                                
11 ETDRS charts are accepted as the worldwide standard for accurate visual acuity measurement 
(Camparini et al., 2001). 
12 A cycloplegic refraction is a procedure used to determine a person’s degree of myopia 
(refractive error in a more strict terminology) by temporarily paralyzing the muscles that aid in 
focusing the eye. It is often used for testing the vision of children who sometimes subconsciously 
accommodate their eyes during the eye examination, making the results invalid.   
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(regardless of the source). Acquisition includes both self-purchase and voucher 
redemption (in the case of the Ordeal group). Ownership is one for all students in 
the Free Delivery group.13  
Use is defined by whether a student wears his or her glasses. Use was 
measured through unannounced checks to observe whether students were wearing 
glasses in class. However, because observation of whether glasses were worn at a 
particular point in time may over- or underestimate the level of regular use, we 
supplement this measure with self-reported survey responses of whether children 
wore eyeglasses and whether they wear them regularly outside of class.  
Two rounds of unannounced checks were conducted to collect information 
on the ownership and use of eyeglasses. A short-term check was done in early 
November 2012 (approximately one month after glasses and vouchers were 
distributed). In this round, a team of two enumerators made unannounced visits to 
each of the 251 schools and recorded the number of students in sample classes 
that were wearing their glasses. To be counted as wearing glasses, the student had 
to have been observed with their glasses on. After this count was finished, 
students that had been diagnosed with myopia in baseline eye examination were 
given a short survey that included questions about whether they owned eyeglasses, 
how they acquired them, and how often they wore them. In order to check with 
students that said that they owned glasses actually did, we asked to see the glasses 
(if they were with the student at school—e.g., if they were in his/her desk or 
backpack). If the glasses were at home, we followed up with phone calls to the 
parents. 
 A second, long-term, check was conducted alongside an endline survey in 
May 2013 (seven months after eyeglasses and vouchers were distributed and 
                                                
13 We do not adjust ownership for lost or broken eyeglasses during the program because our focus 
is on cost-effectiveness and costs for these eyeglasses had already been incurred. By the long-term 
follow-up, the reported rate of lost and broken eyeglasses was also small (5.6% in the Free 
Delivery group and 4.6% in the Ordeal group; the difference is not significant at the 10% level). 
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training was conducted). In line with the first round of unannounced checks, a 
team of two enumerators was sent into schools in advance of the rest of the survey 
team to conduct classroom checks. In this second round of checks, enumerators 
were given a list of the children diagnosed with myopia to record individual-level 
information on their usage of glasses.  
 
D. Descriptive Statistics and Balance  
Of the 19,934 students given eye examinations at baseline, 3,177 (16%) 
were found to require eyeglasses. Only these students are included in the analysis 
sample.  
The baseline characteristics of the students in our sample are shown in 
Table 2. The first two columns show the mean and standard deviation in the Free 
Delivery, No Information Campaign group. Columns 3-7 show coefficients 
estimated by regressing each of the baseline characteristics on a vector of 
indicators for the other treatment arms and indicators for randomization strata. 
Column 8 reports the p-value from test of a null hypothesis that these coefficients 
are jointly zero. Only three of the 55 coefficients tested are significantly different 
from zero and none of the joint tests are rejected at conventional levels suggesting 
good overall balance across experimental groups.  
On average, only 18.9% (601 out of 3177) of students who needed glasses 
had them at the time of the baseline (Row 8). In line with findings in the literature, 
lack of awareness and misinformation were prevalent and may play a role in 
explaining this low rate. For example, less than half of myopic children knew they 
were myopic (Row 9). Nearly 75% of parents believed that wearing eyeglasses 
could deteriorate one’s vision (Row 10). Generally, the education level of parents 
was low: only 22.6% of children had at least one parent who had attended high 
school (Row 3). Nine percent of students in the sample had parents who had both 
migrated elsewhere for work (Row 4). 
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Attrition at the short and long term visits was limited (Online Appendix 
Table 1). Only 19 out of 3,177 students could not be followed in the short term 
and 127 (4%) could not be followed in the long term. There is slightly higher 
short-term attrition in the Market, No Information Campaign group; however the 
magnitude is small (1.7 percentage points).  
 
IV. Results: Acquisition, Ownership and Usage 
 
A. Acquisition and Ownership 
We begin our analysis by comparing ownership in the short and long term 
across the experimental groups. To do so, we use OLS to estimate the regression !!"# = ! + !!!"#!! + !!!"#$%!! + !!"!"#$%!!×!"#!!  + !!!"#$%!! +  !!"!"#$%!!×!"#!! +!!!! + !!"#,   (1) 
where !!" is a binary indicator for the eyeglass ownership of child i in school j 
in wave t (short-term or long-term). !"#!!  is a dummy variable indicating 
schools receiving the Information Campaign; !"#$%!!  is a dummy variable 
indicating schools in the Ordeal group; and !"#$%!! indicates schools in the 
Market group. The coefficient !!  captures the effect of the information 
campaign in the Free Delivery group; !! compares ownership in the Ordeal 
group to that in the Free Delivery group; and !! compares ownership in the 
Market group to that in the Free Delivery group. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms, !!"  and !!" , give the additional effect of the Information 
Campaign in the Ordeal and Market groups relative to the effect of the 
Information Campaign in the Free Delivery group. !! is a vector of dummy 
variables for randomization strata. We adjust standard errors for clustering at the 
school level using the cluster-corrected Huber-White estimator. 
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The results for ownership are shown in Table 3. The first two columns 
show estimates from Equation (1) but collapsing data to the school level. The next 
two columns show the individual level results. Odd-numbered columns show 
results for the short-term (approximately one month after initial distribution) and 
even-numbered columns show long-term (seven month) results. Note that all of 
the children in the Free Delivery group have a value of 1 for ownership in both 
the short and long term so coefficients show estimated percentage point 
deviations from full ownership. 
The second row in the table shows that, in the short term, the ordeal 
screened out approximately 15 percent of individuals who would have been given 
eyeglasses under free delivery. By the long-term wave, ownership increased only 
by 5 percent in the Ordeal group, suggesting that if individuals were going to 
redeem their voucher, they did so shortly after receiving one. Seven months after 
the distribution of vouchers, approximately 88 percent of individuals had 
redeemed them for free eyeglasses. This high redemption rate is somewhat 
remarkable given the cost of the ordeal (discussed in more detail below in Section 
V). Ownership in the Ordeal group was 50 percent higher than in the Market 
group, which was approximately 40 percent at seven months (row 4). The 
Information Campaign had no distinguishable effects on ownership in the Ordeal 
or Market groups (rows 3 and 5).  
 
B. Correlates of Eyeglass Acquisition  
 In Table 4, we look at correlates of eyeglass ownership in the long term in 
the Ordeal and Market groups. Although not causal, this analysis provides useful 
information on (a) how redemption rates are correlated with costs imposed by the 
ordeal and (b) whether more myopic children and children from poorer 
households are more likely to redeem their voucher (i.e., to what degree do 
vouchers target based on need). Additionally, although the Information Campaign 
 18 
had no distinguishable effect on the levels of redemption and ownership in the 
Ordeal and Market groups, it is possible that providing information affected the 
selection process—i.e. the composition of those selecting into ownership could be 
different with and without the Information Campaign. To analyze these issues, we 
estimate linear probability models where the binary dependent variable is equal to 
one if a student owns eyeglasses in the long-term wave. We estimate correlates 
separately for each of four experimental groups: Ordeal without the Information 
Campaign, Ordeal with Information, Market without Information and Market with 
Information. 
 Beginning with the model for the Ordeal without Information group 
(column 1), we find that—conditional on other covariates—the distance to the 
county seat (a proxy for the cost of the ordeal) is a significant predictor of 
ownership. Being in the furthest quintile reduces ownership by 21 percentage 
points compared to the first quintile. We find little association, however, with 
proxies for degree of need: visual acuity and household asset quintile are largely 
uncorrelated with ownership (joint p-value = 0.299—though all children in the 
sample are myopic and in need of eyeglasses). It therefore appears that the cost of 
going through the ordeal to acquire eyeglasses is the main driver of selection in 
this group rather than absolute need. We also find a significant relationship with 
ownership at baseline and whether children think eyeglasses are good looking – 
possibly indicating students more likely to wear glasses once acquired.  
 The selection process is significantly different under the Ordeal when 
combined with the Information Campaign (column 2 - Chow test statistic: 17.22, 
p-value <0.001). Interestingly, the cost of the ordeal (distance) is, marginally, no 
longer a significant predictor of ownership (joint p-value = 0.104) and distance is 
significantly less correlated with ownership than in the model for the Ordeal 
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without Information group.14 Keeping in mind that these estimates are not causal, 
providing information appears to damper the effect of the ordeal cost on voucher 
redemption. This finding contrasts with findings from elsewhere that information 
is complementary with price subsidies (information increases sensitivity to price 
(Ashraf et al., 2013)). Households that are classified as informed about eyeglasses 
at baseline are also (marginally) more likely than uniformed households to 
redeem their voucher when there is an Information Campaign.15  
 In the Market groups (columns 3 and 4) there is a strong relationship 
between eyeglass acquisition (purchase) and the degree of myopia (note that 
higher LogMAR values correspond to worse vision). Household wealth, on the 
other hand, is still uncorrelated with purchase. Indirectly this suggests that 
liquidity constraints may not play a significant role in determining eyeglass 
demand. Rather, the more important role of subsidies in this context may be to 
facilitate learning through experience (as discussed in Dupas (2014)). 
 
C. Usage 
Usage results are presented in Table 5. We estimate two types of effects 
on usage: usage conditional on eyeglass ownership (shown in panel A) and 
unconditional usage or “effective coverage” (panel B). For both types of usage 
rates, we compare across groups using the same specification as with ownership 
(equation 1), but with measures of eyeglass usage as the dependent variable. We 
                                                
14 Running a separate linear probability model (pooling the ordeal without information and ordeal 
with information groups) interacting distance measures with a dummy variable for the information 
campaign gives a p-value of 0.003 for a test that coefficients on these interactions are jointly zero. 
Entering distance linearly yields a similar result.  
15 Information status at baseline was determined by reducing six baseline variables (parent belief 
that eyeglasses will harm vision, awareness of own myopia status, whether a family member wears 
eyeglasses, whether eye exercises are believed to treat myopia, and whether it was believed that 
children were too young for eyeglasses) into an index using the GLS weighting procedure 
described in Anderson (2008). Those with index scores greater than the median in the full sample 
are classified as “informed.” 
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examine effects on three different measures of usage: whether a student was 
observed wearing eyeglasses during unannounced checks; whether a student 
self-reported using eyeglasses at all; and whether a student reported that they use 
their eyeglasses regularly, including outside of class (See Section III.C for details 
on each). Although the levels of these different measures vary, as can be seen 
from the results in Table 5, the observed pattern of results is similar. We therefore 
focus our discussion on the results based on unannounced checks. 
For short-term conditional usage (Table 5, panel A, column 1), we find the 
lowest rates in the Free Delivery without Information group (32.9 percent). 
Adding the Information Campaign to free delivery increases usage substantially 
(by 18 percentage points, or a 55% increase). Conditional usage is also 14 
percentage points higher under the ordeal than under free delivery. The effects of 
the Information Campaign and of the Ordeal, however, appear to be substitutes as 
there is essentially no effect of the Information Campaign under the ordeal. 
Conditional usage under the ordeal with the Information Campaign was 
approximately 44 percent, or 11.4 percentage points higher than under free 
delivery. This is significantly less than the 51 percent rate of conditional usage 
under free delivery with the Information Campaign (p-value: 0.02). The highest 
rate of conditional usage was in the Market with Information Group at 65.1 
percent, though this is not significantly higher than in the Market without 
Information Group (60.1 percent).  
The pattern of long-term results (seven months after initial distribution) is 
similar to that in the short term, but the gaps in usage between the groups were 
narrower. By the long-term follow-up, usage increased slightly in the Free 
Delivery group (from 32.9 percent to 36.8 percent). Long-term usage in the Free 
Delivery with Information group remained significantly higher (by 7.7 percentage 
points) than Free Delivery without Information. Usage in the Ordeal group, 
however, decreased slightly by 3.5 percentage points (from 46.8 percent in the 
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short-term to 43.3 percent in the long-term) and was no longer significantly 
higher than usage in the Free Delivery group. Usage in the Ordeal group with 
Information was also not significantly different than the Free Delivery group. 
Conditional usage in the Market group remained significantly higher than the 
other groups at 58.5 percent. 
Differences across groups in usage unconditional on eyeglass ownership 
(Panel B) give an indication of the “effective coverage”—the total number of 
children wearing eyeglasses—obtained under each of the treatments. We find the 
highest rate of effective coverage with Free Delivery combined with the 
Information Campaign, both in the short and long term (51.5 percent in the 
short-term and 44.4 percent in the long term; unconditional usage is the same as 
conditional usage in the Free Delivery groups since all students own eyeglasses). 
This is significantly higher than the Ordeal Groups with and without the 
Information Campaign in the short-term but not in the long-term (effective 
coverage was 38-40 percent in the Ordeal group with and without the Information 
Campaign in both the short and long terms). Usage in the Free Delivery group 
without the Information Campaign is less than unconditional usage in the Ordeal 
group, but not significantly so. The lowest effective coverage was in the Market 
groups (25.9 percent without Information in the long term and 28.6 percent with 
Information in the long term, difference not significant). 
 Figure 1 plots together the estimates of ownership and unconditional usage 
(effective coverage) based on unannounced checks for the short term (Figure 1A) 
and long term (Figure 1B). For each experimental group, the top grey bar is 
ownership and the lower green bar is unconditional usage. The grey area 
represents an estimate of waste: This is the proportion of eyeglasses that were 
distributed under the program but not used (based on observation during the 
unannounced check).  
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In both the short and long term there is a similar pattern. Waste is highest 
in the Free Delivery only group. In this group, around 63 percent of eyeglasses 
distributed under the program were not being used at the time of long-term 
unannounced visits. Requiring that recipients undergo an Ordeal reduced waste by 
11 percentage points in the long term to 52 percent (approximately the same 
amount with and without Information). However, this reduction in waste is only 
slightly larger than the reduction in waste from adding the Information Campaign 
to Free Delivery, which reduced waste by 7.6 percentage points to 55.6 percent in 
the long term. Free Delivery combined with the Information Campaign also 
achieved the highest rate of unconditional usage (effective coverage). We 
consider these relative reductions further as part of cost-effectiveness calculations 
below in Section V. 
 
D. Why Does Information Affect Usage Under Free Delivery but not Under an 
Ordeal? 
Above we find that the Information Campaign had a significant impact in 
the Free Delivery group but not in the Ordeal group. What could have led to this 
difference in the impact of information on use across the two methods of 
distribution? In this section we conduct an exploratory analysis to test two 
potential explanations.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Ordeal Selection  
The first hypothesis we consider is that those most responsive to the 
Information Campaign (in terms of increased usage) were screened out by the 
ordeal mechanism. In other words, those who chose not to redeem their voucher 
would have been most responsive to information if eyeglasses were delivered to 
them. Because these individuals were not screened out of eyeglass ownership 
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under free delivery, they were able to increase usage in response to the 
Information Campaign.  
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the treatment effects of the 
Information Campaign on eyeglass usage among those in the Free Delivery group 
who would be least likely to redeem their voucher had they been in the ordeal 
group. To identify this subgroup, we first use the estimated model of the 
determinants of voucher redemption in the Ordeal group (discussed in section 
IV.B above and presented in Table 4) to predict a probability of redeeming a 
voucher for each child in the Free Delivery group. Although the relevant selection 
model is voucher redemption with the Information Campaign, we also predict 
probabilities of redemption without the Information Campaign for comparison. 
We then use these predicted probabilities to classify Free Delivery children into 
low, medium and high probability subgroups. Finally, we estimate the treatment 
effect of the Information Campaign within each of these subgroups. To compute 
standard errors, we bootstrap the entire procedure. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6. Using the model of 
voucher redemption with the Information Campaign (panel B), we find that those 
in the Free Delivery group with a probability of voucher redemption in the lowest 
tercile were most responsive to the Information Campaign. We estimate that the 
Information Campaign increased eyeglass use in this subgroup by 17.9 percentage 
points. Estimated effects for the medium and high probability groups are not 
different from zero (point estimates are -3.2 and 3.4 percentage points, 
respectively). The power of this test is low, however, and the effect of information 
in the lowest tercile is not statistically larger than in the medium (p-value=0.101) 
or high probability subgroups (p-value=0.285). Nevertheless, the much larger and 
significant point estimate for the low probability group lends some support to the 
hypothesis that selection out of eyeglass ownership under the ordeal mechanism 
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played a role in the different effects of information in the Ordeal and Free 
Delivery groups.  
Using the model of voucher redemption without the Information 
Campaign we find the effects of Information on usage are concentrated among 
those with a medium probability of redemption (panel A). This suggests that it 
was not the selection in response to the ordeal itself that reduced the effects of 
information on ex-post use in the Ordeal group, but rather selection in response to 
the Ordeal and Information Campaign combined. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Information and Ordeal Salience 
A second hypothesis for why the Information Campaign affected usage in 
the Free Delivery group but not in the Ordeal group is that undergoing the ordeal, 
in itself, increased ex-post use through a channel similar to the channel through 
which information increased use in the Free Delivery group. Therefore, because 
this mechanism had already been “exploited” in the Ordeal group, providing 
information had little additional effect (i.e. the two effects were substitutes). In 
the Free Delivery group, on the other hand, providing information was able to 
affect use through this mechanism. 
One possible such mechanism is an increase in the salience of eyeglasses. 
Results from previous studies suggest that information campaigns often work, not 
by providing new information, but by increasing the salience of a good (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2011). The act of undergoing an ordeal could plausibly also 
increase salience. If salience is an important mechanism for increased usage and 
salience from these two sources are substitutes for one another, information will 
have little effect when an ordeal is in place (and vice versa).  
To examine the potential role of salience, we classify the sample by 
“knowledge status” (that is, is one informed or uninformed) at baseline and test 
the effects of the ordeal and information campaign within these subgroups. As 
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above, we classify a household as “informed” at baseline if they have a baseline 
information index score above the median and “uninformed” if below the median. 
If effects operate through increased salience, there should be little effect on 
uninformed households (increasing the salience of a good thought to be of little 
value should not increase its use). Alternative mechanisms, such as the 
Information Campaign affecting use by updating beliefs (i.e., participants in the 
Information Campaign learned something new about the need to wear eyeglasses) 
or the ordeal affecting use through a sunk cost effect (Thaler, 1980), would be 
more likely to increase use among initially uninformed households. 
In Table 7 we estimate differences in long-term ownership, conditional 
usage and unconditional usage between the Free Delivery without information 
group and the Free Delivery with information group, the Ordeal only group, and 
the Ordeal with information group; separately for households classified as 
uninformed at baseline (columns 1-3) and those classified as informed at baseline 
(columns 4-6).16 The results are striking. As may be expected, the ordeal selected 
out approximately 6 percent more uninformed households than informed 
households (columns 1 & 4 – difference significant, p-value= 0.03). More 
importantly, however, most of the differences in usage between the groups seem 
attributable to effects among households informed at baseline. Despite high 
statistical precision, there are no distinguishable differences in conditional or 
unconditional use between uninformed households in the Free Delivery-only 
group and the other groups.  
Among informed households, on the other hand, the Information 
Campaign increased long-term usage by 14 percentage points when glasses were 
freely delivered. Usage in the Ordeal group was also higher than that in the Free 
Delivery group (row 2, columns 5 and 6). The effects of the Ordeal and 
                                                
16 Estimations instead using each variable used to construct the baseline information index are 
shown in Online Appendix Table 2. 
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Information Campaign on use, however, were strong substitutes among 
households informed at baseline. Conditional usage in the Ordeal group with the 
Information Campaign was not statistically different than in the Free Delivery 
group with the Information Campaign (p-value = 0.164) or than in the Ordeal 
group without the Information Campaign (p-value = 0.136). Effective coverage in 
the Ordeal groups with and without the Information Campaign were similar 
(p-value = 0.235), but coverage in the Ordeal group with Information was 8.6 
percent lower than in the Free Delivery group with Information (p-value = 0.071). 
Although we cannot say with certainty that these effects are driven by salience, 
they are consistent with the Information Campaign and the Ordeal both 
addressing limited attention and the combination of the two not increasing 
salience further. 
In sum, we find some support for both mechanisms (selection under the 
ordeal and the substitution of salience effects of information and the ordeal) 
playing a role in explaining why there is an effect of the Information Campaign 
under free delivery but not under the ordeal. Note, however, that with only 10 
percent of households selecting out of ownership by the long term in the Ordeal 
group, the role of selection under the ordeal likely plays less of a role than the 
substitution of salience effects. 
 
V. Cost-Effectiveness 
In this section, we compare cost-effectiveness under the different 
combinations of distribution methods and the Information Campaign, largely 
following the methodologies discussed in McEwan (2012) and Dhaliwal et al. 
(2013). In doing so, we consider effectiveness both in terms of the number of 
children wearing eyeglasses and total vision gain, or gains summed over all 
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children found to be wearing eyeglasses.17 We also present both “programmatic” 
cost-effectiveness (using the direct monetary program costs to the implementing 
organization) and social cost-effectiveness calculations. We calculate social costs 
at the sum of: (a) programmatic costs; (b) the cost of public funds; and (c) costs 
incurred by households in responding to the policies (including the costs to 
households in undertaking the ordeal).  
In calculating social cost-effectiveness, one issue is whether the cost of 
eyeglasses should be counted. On one hand, the cost of transfers such as this 
represent a cost to the implementing organization, but not to society as a whole 
(except for the cost of public funds), because the cost to the implementer is offset 
by the benefit to those receiving the transfer (Dhaliwal et al., 2013). On the other 
hand, beneficiaries may not value eyeglasses at the cost incurred by the 
implementer (but their average valuation will still not be zero). Indeed, this is a 
main motivation for subsidizing goods in the first place. As a compromise, we 
present social cost-effectiveness calculations both including the cost of eyeglasses 
as well as calculations that exclude the cost of eyeglasses for those found to be 
wearing eyeglasses (but still including the cost of public funds corresponding to 
programmatic eyeglasses purchases).  
To account for estimation errors, we use Monte Carlo simulations to 
calculate how often each policy (combination of distribution methods and the 
Information Campaign) is likely to be the most cost-effective of those examined 
(an approach proposed by Evans and Popova (2016)). We use this approach to 
simultaneously take into account errors for three different effect estimates that 
serve as inputs to the cost-effectiveness analysis: unconditional use (effective 
coverage), voucher redemption in the Ordeal groups, and self-purchases of 
eyeglasses. Each simulation draw randomly selects simulated values for each 
                                                
17 In our calculations we use the number of children found to be wearing eyeglasses in the 
long-term unannounced check.  
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effect from normal distributions with means and standard deviations from the 
original coefficient estimates. For each type of cost-effectiveness calculation, we 
report the percentage of 100,000 draws for which each policy is the most 
cost-effective. 
Table 8 presents the results.18 This table shows costs and benefits of each 
experimental group relative to the market group without the information 
campaign. The key finding is that the combination of Free Delivery with the 
Information Campaign is the most cost-effective in terms of both programmatic 
and social costs (and both including and excluding full eyeglass costs). In this 
group, we calculate the programmatic cost of one additional bespectacled child to 
be 1,714 yuan (or $272 at an exchange rate of 6.3 RMB/USD—row 12, column 5). 
The point estimate for the relative social cost is 1,608 yuan ($255) per child 
including full eyeglass costs and 947 yuan ($150) excluding eyeglass costs for 
wearers (rows 14 and 16, column 5). For each of these three types of costs, Free 
Delivery with the Information Campaign was the most cost effective policy in 
more than 90 percent of simulation draws. 
The second most cost-effective policy (based on the simulation) is the 
Ordeal without the Information Campaign. We calculate programmatic costs for 
this group to be 2,713 yuan ($431) per additional child (row 12, column 2), or 58 
percent higher than the Free Delivery with Information group. In terms of relative 
social costs—which take into account costs incurred by households in undergoing 
the ordeal—the Ordeal group without Information is even less cost effective (the 
cost per additional child (row 14, column 2) is 76 percent higher than the Free 
Delivery group with Information). The results are similar including and excluding 
full eyeglass costs (row 16, column 2).  
                                                
18 See table notes for further details about these calculations. 
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Accounting for the gain in visual acuity of those ultimately wearing 
eyeglasses (calculated as the difference between corrected visual acuity—vision 
with eyeglasses—and presenting visual acuity—vision without eyeglasses), the 
differences between the cost-effectiveness of the Free Delivery with Information 
policy and that of the Ordeal without Information policy become even larger 
(rows 18-23). Programmatic costs are 3,126 yuan ($496) per line of visual acuity 
improvement (measured in LogMAR units) in the Free Delivery with Information 
group (row 18, column 5) and 67 percent higher in the Ordeal group without 
Information (5,225 yuan ($829) per line – row 18, column 2). Social costs per line 
of improvement are more than 86 percent more expensive in the Ordeal group 
without Information compared to Free Delivery with Information (rows 20 and 
22).19   
A remaining question is whether the ordeal could have been more 
cost-effective than free delivery with information if it had screened out more 
non-users. Given the effects that we find, the ordeal would have needed to screen 
out around 48 percent of all myopic children—without reducing the number or 
composition of children using glasses—to achieve the same cost-effectiveness as 
free delivery with information.20 Our estimates of how redemption falls with 
distance to the county seat imply that requiring a travel distance of 181 km would 
                                                
19 One caveat to these calculations is that they are sensitive to assumptions on the programmatic 
cost of eyeglasses. Because eyeglasses were donated for the purposes of this program, we use the 
market cost of eyeglasses (350 yuan) collected as part of the baseline survey (following Dhaliwal 
et al. (2013)). If the program were scaled up, however, eyeglasses could conceivably be purchased 
more cheaply if bought in bulk. We calculate that if the programmatic cost of eyeglasses could be 
reduced to 124 yuan per pair (but the cost of eyeglasses purchased in the market remained at 350 
yuan), the Free Delivery without Information policy would be as cost-effective as Free Delivery 
with Information (but the usage rate would still be lower).    
20 The total cost of eyeglasses in the Ordeal group would need to be reduced to 90,375 yuan, 
which corresponds to a redemption rate of 52.5 percent given a cost of 350 yuan for one pair of 
eyeglasses, for social cost-effectiveness in terms of total visual acuity improvement to be the same 
as the Free Delivery with Information group. Excluding the direct cost of eyeglasses for wearers 
(counting eyeglasses as a transfer), the Ordeal would need to screen out 33.6%.  
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be needed to achieve that amount of screening. This would impose a cost on 
households of around 648 yuan, more than if they traveled to the county seat and 
purchased their own. Of course this calculation makes several assumptions, but 
the point is to illustrate that, in our context, the amount of deadweight loss that 
would need to be imposed to screen out enough individuals is likely so large that 
the ordeal could never be more (socially) cost-effective than free delivery with 
information. 
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper provides new evidence to inform the design of policies 
distributing subsidized goods in low and middle income countries. In the context 
of a program distributing subsidized eyeglasses to myopic children in rural China, 
we compare alternative distribution policies in terms of cost-effectiveness and in 
terms of the overall rate of use achieved.  
We find that an ordeal mechanism requiring beneficiaries to travel to their 
county seat to redeem vouchers for free eyeglasses improved cost-effectiveness 
relative to a policy of free delivery by screening out individuals who would not 
have used eyeglasses if freely delivered. The ordeal also did not reduce the overall 
rate of usage of eyeglasses compared to free delivery. This finding echoes 
research by Dupas et al. (2013) who find a similar result for a program 
distributing water treatment in Kenya. 
We also find, however that – when combined with an information 
campaign designed to provide information on the benefits of eyeglasses and 
address misinformation about the use of eyeglasses – free delivery outperforms 
the ordeal mechanism (with and without an information campaign) both in terms 
of cost-effectiveness and the overall rate of use achieved. One reason for this is 
that the information campaign increased eyeglass use under free delivery but not 
under the ordeal mechanism. We present evidence that this is due to the ordeal 
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selecting out individuals most responsive to the information campaign and also to 
salience effects of the ordeal and information campaign being substitutes.  
In presenting these results, we stress that, as with related studies, our 
particular findings are likely specific to context. For example, an ordeal 
mechanism would likely perform better in contexts where the elasticity of 
voucher redemption to time costs is higher. The effects of an information 
campaign—and how they vary under free delivery or an ordeal mechanism—will 
also likely depend on whether the target population is initially more or less 
informed about a good. Results will also likely differ for goods with different 
attributes, in particular goods with different potential for positive and negative 
learning over time. 
Overall, our results show that there is substantial room for the 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of policies distributing subsidized goods to be 
improved by adjusting additional design features, such as distribution modes and 
accompanying information or social marketing campaigns, in addition to (or in 
combination with) adjusting subsidy levels.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
A. Short-term 
 
B. Long-term 
Figure 1: Acquisition and Usage by Experimental Group 
Notes: Gray bars show rate of eyeglass ownership and green bars show usage rate 
based on observed use during unannounced visits. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Short-term visits (Figure 1A) were done one month after 
initial distribution and long-term visits (Figure 1B) were done seven months after 
initial distribution. 
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Free Delivery Ordeal Market Total
42 41 42 125
(527) (492) (510) (1,529)
42 42 42 126
(626) (496) (526) (1,648)
84 83 84 251
(1,153) (988) (1,036) (3,177)
No Information
Campaign
Information Campaign
Table 1: Experimental Design
Notes: Table shows the distribution of schools (myopic students) across experimental groups. In
the Free Delivery group, eyeglasses were delivered to schools; in the Ordeal group, vouchers for
free eyeglasses were redeemable in the county seat; the Market group only received eyeglass
prescriptions. The Information Campaign  focused on conveying the benefits of eyeglasses and
addressing common misconceptions concerning the use of eyeglasses. One school in the Ordeal,
No Information cell was found during the baseline survey to not have any myopic students and
was therefore excluded from the randomization.
Total
Distribution Group
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Mean SD
Free
Delivery,
Information
Ordeal,
No
Information
Ordeal,
Information
Market,
No
Information
Market,
Information
Joint Test
P-value Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) 0.480 0.500 0.005 0.010 -0.002 0.050 0.001 0.500 3177
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
(2) 0.611 0.488 -0.014 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.036 0.829 3177
(0.031) (0.034) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
(3) 0.226 0.419 -0.005 -0.058* -0.031 -0.017 -0.028 0.451 3163
(0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.030)
(4) 0.092 0.289 0.003 0.022 -0.003 0.009 0.016 0.653 3147
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
(5) -0.057 1.290 -0.104 -0.173* -0.118 -0.127 -0.105 0.448 3032
(0.086) (0.088) (0.101) (0.082) (0.089)
(6) 33.565 22.433 2.693 0.065 -1.991 5.184 -1.697 0.365 3177
(4.109) (4.419) (4.602) (3.558) (4.080)
(7) 0.629 0.202 0.002 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 0.041** 0.172 3177
(0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
(8) 0.188 0.391 0.014 0.025 -0.021 0.021 -0.016 0.169 3177
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.019)
(9) 0.473 0.500 -0.015 0.014 -0.011 0.000 -0.025 0.894 3157
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
(10) 0.747 0.435 -0.002 0.012 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.972 3011
(0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031)
(11) 0.545 0.498 -0.015 -0.016 -0.033 0.017 -0.010 0.812 3177
(0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036)
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Check
Free Delivery,
No Information
Distance to county seat (km)
Household assets (Index)
Both parents out-migrated for work (0/1)
At least one parent has high school education or above
(0/1)
Grade 5 (0/1)
Male (0/1)
***Significant at the 1 percent level.     
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
*   Significant at the 10 percent level.
Visual acuity of worse eye (LogMAR)
Coefficient (standard error) on:
Notes: Data source: baseline survey. The first and second columns show the mean and standard deviation of each baseline characteristic for myopic children in the Free
Distribution, No Information group. Severity of myopia is measured by the  LogMAR of the worse eye. LogMAR takes value from -0.3 (best vision) to 1.6 (worst vision), with
an increment of 0.1 corresponding to a one line change on the vision chart; students with normal vision would have value less than or equal to 0.0. The household asset index was
calculated using a list of 13 items and weighting by the first principal component. Distance is the distance from the school to the county seat. Columns 3 through 7 show
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from a regression of the characteristic on other five treatment dummies, controlling for randomization strata. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level. Column 8 shows the p-value from a Wald test that coefficients are jointly zero. All tests account for clustering at the school level.
Believes eye exercises treat myopia (0/1)
Parents believe wearing eyeglasses will harm vision
(0/1)
Aware of own myopia (0/1)
Owns eyeglasses (0/1)
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Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Information -0.005 0.002 -0.004 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
(2) Ordeal -0.149*** -0.097*** -0.164*** -0.119***
(0.030) (0.028) (0.023) (0.021)
(3) Ordeal×Information 0.020 -0.009 0.056 0.036
(0.051) (0.047) (0.034) (0.031)
(4) Market -0.768*** -0.610*** -0.755*** -0.575***
(0.028) (0.036) (0.024) (0.032)
(5) Market×Information 0.041 0.069 0.021 0.048
(0.044) (0.053) (0.036) (0.045)
(6) Observations 251 251 3132 3054
(7) Adjusted R-squared 0.795 0.675 0.537 0.883
(8) Mean in Free Delivery,
No Information Group
Notes:  Rows (1) to (5) show coefficients on treatment group indicators estimated by OLS using
Equation 1.  Standard errors clustered at school level are reported in parentheses.  Columns (1)
and (2)  report school-level estimates and columns (3) and (4) report  estimates using individual
level data. Columns (1) and (3) report estimates for the short-term follow up one month after
initial distribution. Columns (2) and (4) report estimates for the long-term follow up seven
months after initial distribution. All regressions control for randomization strata indicators.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
**  Significant at the 5 percent level.
*    Significant at the 10 percent level.
School Level Individual Level
Owns eyeglasses:
Table 3: Eyeglass Acquisition and Ownership
1.00 1.00
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Sample:
Ordeal,
No Information
Ordeal,
Information
Market,
No Information
Market,
Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) 0.001 -0.070 0.237** 0.429***
(0.047) (0.044) (0.092) (0.102)
(2) Quintile 2 0.000 -0.026 -0.051 0.328***
(0.036) (0.043) (0.097) (0.068)
(3) Quintile 3 -0.189*** 0.116** 0.035 0.328***
(0.042) (0.054) (0.096) (0.089)
(4) Quintile 4 -0.138** -0.088 0.139 0.155**
(0.052) (0.101) (0.096) (0.059)
(5) Quintile 5 -0.211*** -0.047 0.053 -0.048
(0.037) (0.046) (0.114) (0.123)
Household Assets
(6) Quintile 2 0.034 -0.020 -0.075 -0.057
(0.031) (0.026) (0.047) (0.065)
(7) Quintile 3 0.041 -0.011 0.004 0.040
(0.038) (0.033) (0.061) (0.048)
(8) Quintile 4 0.084** 0.018 0.004 -0.031
(0.040) (0.027) (0.064) (0.056)
(9) Quintile 5 -0.013 0.008 -0.013 -0.006
(0.052) (0.033) (0.059) (0.055)
(10) Owns eyeglasses at baseline (0/1) 0.126*** 0.035 0.643*** 0.432***
(0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.051)
(11) 0.082** 0.028 0.033 0.128
(0.031) (0.018) (0.099) (0.145)
(12) 0.027 0.045* -0.005 0.118***
(0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.040)
(13) Male (0/1) -0.019 -0.026 0.012 0.035
(0.037) (0.027) (0.035) (0.050)
(14) Grade 5 (0/1) 0.031 0.004 -0.030 0.037
(0.031) (0.023) (0.037) (0.052)
(15) -0.049 -0.021 -0.120*** 0.032
(0.041) (0.031) (0.044) (0.045)
(16) 0.055* 0.022 0.031 -0.031
(0.032) (0.022) (0.064) (0.063)
(17) Constant 0.873*** 0.997*** 0.263* -0.149
(0.051) (0.086) (0.132) (0.103)
(18) Observations 434 442 455 475
(19) Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.219 0.334 0.287
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.             
**  Significant at the 5 percent level.      
*    Significant at the 10 percent level.
Distance to County Seat
Table 4: Correlates of Eyeglass Ownership at Long-Term Follow-Up
Owns eyeglasses at long-term (seven-month) follow up
Notes: OLS estimates of a linear probability model with a binary dependent variable that is equal to 1 if the student owned
eyeglasses seven months after initial distribution by experimental group. The regressors were measured at baseline. Sample sizes
are less than the full sample due to observations missing at least one regressor. Severity of myopia is measured by the  LogMAR
of the worse eye. LogMAR takes value from -0.3 (best vision) to 1.6 (worst vision), with an increment of 0.1 corresponding to a
one line change on the vision chart; students with normal vision would have value less than or equal to 0.0. Distance is measured
as the distance from the school to the county seat. The household asset index was calculated using a list of 13 items and
weighting using the first principal component.  Information status at baseline was determined by reducing six baseline variables
(parent belief that eyeglasses will harm vision, awareness of own myopia status, whether a family member wears eyeglasses,
whether eye exercises are believed to treat myopia, and whether it was believed that children were too young for eyeglasses) into
an index using the GLS weighting procedure described in Anderson (2008). Those with index scores greater than the median in
the full sample are classified as informed. Regressions also include county fixed effects (not shown).
Both parents out-migrated for work (0/1)
At least one parent has high school education or above
(0/1)
Informed (0/1)
Thinks eyeglasses good looking at baseline (0/1)
Visual acuity of worse eye (LogMAR)
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Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Information 0.182*** 0.077* 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.191*** 0.083***
(0.058) (0.041) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024)
(2) Ordeal 0.139** 0.065 0.065* 0.041 0.070** 0.048
(0.065) (0.047) (0.038) (0.039) (0.031) (0.030)
(3) Ordeal×Information -0.207** -0.109 -0.085* -0.051 -0.139*** -0.050
(0.092) (0.067) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) (0.040)
(4) Market 0.272*** 0.217*** 0.142*** 0.158*** 0.220*** 0.150***
(0.072) (0.046) (0.051) (0.036) (0.058) (0.042)
(5) Market×Information -0.132 -0.115 -0.081 -0.043 -0.113 -0.041
(0.101) (0.074) (0.063) (0.048) (0.077) (0.060)
(6) Observations 251 2416 2253 2416 2253 2416
(7) Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.095 0.036 0.056 0.087 0.051
(8) Mean in Free Delivery,
No Information Group 0.329 0.368 0.712 0.642 0.139 0.198
(1) Information 0.186*** 0.076* 0.106*** 0.079** 0.183*** 0.081***
(0.055) (0.042) (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.024)
(2) Ordeal 0.059 0.014 -0.068* -0.039 0.031 0.019
(0.059) (0.043) (0.039) (0.038) (0.028) (0.027)
(3) Ordeal×Information -0.176** -0.086 -0.033 -0.025 -0.122*** -0.043
(0.083) (0.064) (0.054) (0.051) (0.044) (0.037)
(4) Market -0.177*** -0.109*** -0.499*** -0.294*** -0.045* -0.042
(0.048) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.027) (0.027)
(5) Market×Information -0.168** -0.049 -0.075 -0.020 -0.146*** -0.039
(0.065) (0.056) (0.051) (0.051) (0.038) (0.038)
(6) Observations 251 3054 3132 3054 3132 3054
(7) Adjusted R-squared 0.295 0.089 0.263 0.121 0.085 0.045
(8) Mean in Free Delivery,
No Information Group 0.329 0.368 0.712 0.642 0.139 0.198
Notes:  Rows (1) to (5) show coefficients on treatment group indicators estimated by OLS using Equation 1.  Standard errors
clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses. Panel A shows estimated effects on eyeglass use conditional on
eyeglass ownership. Panel B shows estimated effects on eyeglass use not conditional on ownership. Columns (1) and (2)
report results from "unannounced checks" where enumerators visited schools unannounced and noted which children were
wearing eyeglasses in class. The protocol used in the short term unannounced check was for enumerators to only count the
number of children wearing eyeglasses. As a result, regressions in column (1) are at the school level. Columns (3) and (4)
report results for self-reported use and columns (5) and (6) report results for self-reported regular use of eyeglasses. Odd-
numbered columns report estimates for the short-term follow up one month after initial distribution. Even-numbered
columns report estimates for the long-term follow up seven months after initial distribution. All regressions control for
randomization strata indicators.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
**  Significant at the 5 percent level.
*    Significant at the 10 percent level.
Panel A: Conditional Usage
Panel B: Unconditional Usage ("Effective Coverage")
Self-reported: Use
eyeglasses
Table 5: Eyeglass Usage
Usage during
unannounced check
Self-reported: Regularly
wears eyeglasses
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N β Bootstrap-SE
(1) Low 346 -0.012 (0.083)
(2) Medium 331 0.200** (0.085)
(3) High 356 -0.018 (0.088)
(1) Low 316 0.179* (0.097)
(2) Medium 367 -0.032 (0.084)
(3) High 350 0.034 (0.095)
Table 6: Endogenous Stratification Estimates - Impact of Information on
Eyeglass Usage under Free Delivery, by Probability of Undertaking Ordeal
Panel A: By probability of redeeming voucher without Information Campaign
Panel B: By probability of redeeming voucher with Information Campaign
Notes: Table reports estimated effects of the information campaign in the free
delivery group on the probability a student is wearing eyeglasses at the time of long-
term unannounced visits by the estimated probability that a voucher would have
been redeemed had the student been in the ordeal group. Panel A reports estimated
effects by probability that a voucher would be redeemed without the information
campaign and Panel B reports effects by the probability that a voucher would be
redeemed with the information campaign. The probability that a voucher would have
been redeemed is estimated by modeling voucher redemption in the ordeal group
with and without the information campaign and using estimated coefficients to
predict probabilities in the free delivery group (voucher redemption model estimates
are shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4).  Row 1 in each panel shows the effect
of the information campaign among students in the free delivery group with an
estimated probability of voucher redemption in the lowest tercile of the sample; row
2 shows estimates for the middle tercile; and row 3 shows estimates for the highest
tercile. Cluster-adjusted bootstrap standard errors are calculated using 400 iterations
of the entire procedure.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
**   Significant at the 5 percent level.
*     Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Information -0.010 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.139*** 0.141***
(0.015) (0.055) (0.055) (0.008) (0.047) (0.046)
(2) Ordeal -0.139*** 0.020 -0.027 -0.082*** 0.159*** 0.120**
(0.027) (0.052) (0.049) (0.019) (0.057) (0.053)
(3) Ordeal×Information 0.041 -0.006 0.016 0.036 -0.226*** -0.206***
(0.037) (0.079) (0.077) (0.024) (0.075) (0.072)
(4) Constant 1.004*** 0.321*** 0.321*** 0.998*** 0.375*** 0.373***
(0.011) (0.031) (0.031) (0.006) (0.035) (0.035)
(5) Observations 916 863 916 1023 994 1023
(6) Adjusted R-squared 0.115 0.074 0.080 0.058 0.095 0.094
**   Significant at the 5 percent level.      
*     Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 7: Impacts of Ordeal and Information Campaign Relative to Free Delivery Without Information Campaign,
By Information Status at Baseline
Uninformed at baseline Informed at baseline
Notes: Table shows estimated effects on eyeglass ownership and usage at the long-term follow up relative to the free
delivery without information group. Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at the school level. Conditional
usage is estimated using the subsample owning eyeglasses. Columns 1-3 show effects among those being classified as
uninformed about eyeglasses at baseline and columns 4-6 show effects for those classified as informed at baseline.
Information status at baseline was determined by reducing six baseline variables (parent belief that eyeglasses will harm
vision, awareness of own myopia status, whether a family member wears eyeglasses, whether eye exercises are believed to
treat myopia, and whether it was believed that children were too young for eyeglasses) into an index using the GLS
weighting procedure described in Anderson (2008). Those with index scores greater than the median in the full sample are
classified as informed. Estimated effects by each of these variables individually are shown in Appendix Table 2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.   
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Market,
Information
Ordeal,
No Information
Ordeal,
Information
Free Delivery,
No Information
Free Delivery,
Information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Information Campaign 14,154            -- 14,154            -- 14,154            
(2) Eyeglasses -- 151,536          159,191          184,450          219,100          
(3) Eyeglass Distribution -- -- -- 16,800            16,800            
(4) Voucher Redemption -- 54,691            56,036            -- --
(5) Self-Purchase 6,340 (78,112) (87,372) (70,248) (65,507)
(6) Cost of Taxation 2,831              30,307            34,669            40,250            50,011            
(7) Programmatic 14,154            151,536          173,345          201,250          250,054          
(8) Social 23,325            158,422          176,678          171,252          234,558          
(9) Social - Excluding Eyeglass Costs for Wearers 23,325            94,708            115,918          103,006          138,154          
(10) Number of Additional Children Wearing Eyeglasses N.S. 56                   52                   62                   146                 
(11) Total Lines of Visual Acuity Improvement (LogMAR) N.S. 29                   29                   36                   80                   
(12) Programmatic N.S. 2,713              3,307              3,254              1,714              
(13) % Draws Most Cost-Effective 6% 1% 0% 92%
(14) Social N.S. 2,836              3,370              2,769              1,608              
(15) % Draws Most Cost-Effective 3% 0% 1% 95%
(16) Social - Excluding Eyeglass Costs for Wearers N.S. 1,696              2,211              1,666              947                 
(17) % Draws Most Cost-Effective 3% 0% 1% 95%
(18) Programmatic N.S. 5,225              5,977              5,590              3,126              
(19) % Draws Most Cost-Effective 3% 1% 1% 95%
(20) Social N.S. 5,463              6,092              4,757              2,932              
(21) % Draws Most Cost-Effective 2% 0% 2% 96%
(22) Social - Excluding Eyeglass Costs for Wearers N.S. 3,266              3,997              2,861              1,727              
(23) % Draws Most Cost-Effective 2% 0% 2% 96%
Notes. All costs in renminbi (exchange rate as of Sept. 2012 was 6.3 RMB/USD). In the Market, No Informaiton group, the cost of providing eye
exams was 130,050 yuan total (3,096 yuan per school) and the total cost to those self-purchashing eyeglasses was 110,823 yuan. The cost of the
information campaign was approximately 337 yuan per school excluding fixed costs of producing campaign materials. As eyeglasses were
donated for the program, we use the market cost of eyeglasses (following Dhaliwal et al., 2013) as measured in the baseline survey (350 yuan
per pair). The cost of delivering eyeglasses was around 400 yuan per school (costs variable with the number of eyeglasses delivered was
relatively small).  Voucher redemption costs to households include transportation costs to and from county seat (assumed to be 1 yuan per km
traveled) and the time costs incurred. Time costs are calculated based on a daily adult wage of 120 yuan for eight hours of work and calculating
total time spent as two-way travel time (assuming an average travel speed of 20 km/hour) plus one hour spent recieving eyeglasses. The cost of
self-purchase is calculated as the sum of travel costs to the county seat, time costs (calculated as for voucher redemption), and the cost of
eyeglasses (also assumed to be 350 yuan). In the absence of good estimates for China, we use a deadweight loss from taxation of 20% of
programmatic costs (Auriol and Warlters, 2012). Lines of visual acuity improvement are calculated as the difference between corrected visual
acuity (vision wearing correctly fit eyeglasses) and presenting visual acuity (vision wihtout eyeglasses). Effects not significant (N.S.) for the
information campaign in the market group. Rows 13, 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 show the percentage of 100,000 simulation draws for which each
policy is the most cost effective. Simulations draw values for the impact of each policy on unconditional use (effective coverage), voucher
redemption (ownership in the ordeal groups), and self-purchase of eyeglasses in the market from normal distributions with means and standard
deviations of original impact estimates.
Cost of Public Funds
Total Costs
Panel B. Benefits
Panel C. Cost Effectiveness
Number of Children Wearing Eyeglasses (RMB/Child)
Lines of Visual Acuity (RMB/LogMAR units)
Costs to Households
Table 8: Cost Effectiveness Calculations
Incremental Amount Relative to Market, No Information Group
Panel A. Costs
Programmatic Costs
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Information 0.007 0.005
(0.006) (0.014)
(2) Ordeal 0.009 -0.002
(0.008) (0.014)
(3) Ordeal×Information -0.003 0.001
(0.011) (0.020)
(4) Market 0.017** -0.003
(0.007) (0.013)
(5) Market×Information -0.019* -0.019
(0.010) (0.018)
(6) 0.014 0.003
(0.013) (0.020)
(7) Quintile 2 0.002 0.014
(0.007) (0.013)
(8) Quintile 3 0.002 0.007
(0.004) (0.007)
(9) Quintile 4 0.006 0.011
(0.008) (0.014)
(10) Quintile 5 0.002 0.030**
(0.008) (0.014)
(11) Quintile 2 0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.011)
(12) Quintile 3 0.002 -0.004
(0.007) (0.011)
(13) Quintile 4 0.003 -0.013
(0.007) (0.011)
(14) Quintile 5 -0.003 -0.010
(0.006) (0.010)
(15) Owns eyeglasses at baseline (0/1) -0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.011)
(16) -0.004 -0.000
(0.005) (0.009)
(17) 0.005 0.028
(0.012) (0.027)
(18) 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.008)
(19) Male (0/1) 0.012** -0.006
(0.005) (0.007)
(20) Grade 5 (0/1) -0.000 0.004
(0.004) (0.007)
(21) 0.006 0.020**
(0.006) (0.009)
(22) 0.005 0.014
(0.008) (0.012)
(23) Constant 0.006* -0.026* 0.041*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.020)
(24) Observations 3177 2943 3177 2943
(25) Adjusted R-squared 0.009 0.007 -0.001 0.001
(26) Mean in Free Distribution, No Information Group
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.             
**  Significant at the 5 percent level.         
*    Significant at the 10 percent level.
Notes: Table shows estimated coefficients from a regression of a missing value for eyeglass ownership in the short
and long-term waves on treatment indicators and baseline covariates. Regressions in columns 1 and 3 additionally
control for randomization strata and columns 2 and 4 control for county fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering within schools. Some observations are not included in regressions reported in columns 2 and 4
due to missing values for a baseline covariate.
Online Appendix Table 1: Attrition
Visual acuity of worse eye (LogMAR)
0.0400.006
Distance
Household Assets
Aware of own myopia at baseline  (0/1)
Thinks eyeglasses good looking at baseline (0/1)
Missing Short-Term
Parents believe wearing eyeglasses will harm vision at baseline
(0/1)
At least one parent has high school education or above (0/1)
Both parents out-migrated for work (0/1)
Missing Long-Term
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Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage Ownership
Conditional
Usage
Unconditional
Usage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (16) (17) (18)
Subsample:
(1) Information -0.005 0.062 0.060 -0.006 0.036 0.032 0.001 0.094** 0.093** -0.005 0.097** 0.096** 0.001 -0.014 -0.013
(0.010) (0.042) (0.042) (0.013) (0.047) (0.047) (0.011) (0.044) (0.045) (0.011) (0.045) (0.045) (0.014) (0.058) (0.058)
(2) Ordeal -0.121*** 0.050 0.004 -0.150*** 0.028 -0.022 -0.099*** 0.078 0.042 -0.094*** 0.068 0.031 -0.116*** -0.032 -0.067
(0.020) (0.046) (0.042) (0.029) (0.056) (0.052) (0.020) (0.050) (0.047) (0.021) (0.050) (0.045) (0.030) (0.069) (0.065)
(3) Ordeal×Information 0.057** -0.050 -0.022 0.047 -0.085 -0.059 0.002 -0.107 -0.098 0.019 -0.095 -0.081 0.055 0.023 0.043
(0.027) (0.068) (0.065) (0.041) (0.083) (0.079) (0.032) (0.072) (0.070) (0.029) (0.069) (0.066) (0.035) (0.092) (0.090)
(4) Constant 1.001*** 0.349*** 0.347*** 1.003*** 0.280*** 0.282*** 0.999*** 0.309*** 0.307*** 1.000*** 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.994*** 0.365*** 0.361***
(0.008) (0.025) (0.025) (0.009) (0.030) (0.029) (0.008) (0.026) (0.026) (0.008) (0.028) (0.028) (0.010) (0.034) (0.033)
(5) Observations 1463 1397 1463 1085 1022 1085 1339 1276 1339 1052 1009 1052 636 606 636
(6) Adjusted R-squared 0.106 0.100 0.104 0.103 0.071 0.071 0.095 0.084 0.088 0.097 0.095 0.098 0.123 0.088 0.093
Subsample:
(1) Information 0.004 0.138** 0.138** 0.004 0.137*** 0.142*** 0.000 0.056 0.058 0.015 0.098** 0.103** -0.000 0.107*** 0.107***
(0.014) (0.068) (0.069) (0.008) (0.047) (0.046) (0.012) (0.047) (0.047) (0.013) (0.047) (0.047) (0.010) (0.039) (0.039)
(2) Ordeal -0.059** 0.183** 0.148* -0.062*** 0.135** 0.107** -0.115*** 0.127** 0.064 -0.116*** 0.110* 0.060 -0.099*** 0.125** 0.080*
(0.023) (0.084) (0.083) (0.014) (0.056) (0.051) (0.027) (0.056) (0.052) (0.024) (0.061) (0.057) (0.020) (0.051) (0.046)
(3) Ordeal×Information -0.038 -0.319*** -0.318*** 0.019 -0.190** -0.180*** 0.081** -0.185** -0.129* 0.043 -0.199** -0.170** 0.025 -0.174** -0.151**
(0.037) (0.106) (0.104) (0.017) (0.073) (0.068) (0.031) (0.082) (0.077) (0.036) (0.084) (0.079) (0.029) (0.070) (0.066)
(4) Constant 0.999*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.996*** 0.436*** 0.431*** 0.997*** 0.426*** 0.423*** 0.991*** 0.377*** 0.372*** 0.999*** 0.354*** 0.352***
(0.010) (0.050) (0.050) (0.006) (0.034) (0.033) (0.009) (0.035) (0.035) (0.008) (0.033) (0.033) (0.007) (0.028) (0.027)
(5) Observations 491 475 491 952 927 952 706 681 706 999 953 998 1414 1356 1414
(6) Adjusted R-squared 0.046 0.062 0.060 0.102 0.102 0.107 0.106 0.092 0.090 0.124 0.110 0.114 0.089 0.097 0.100
Online Appendix Table 2:  Impacts of Ordeal and Information Campaign Relative to Free Distribution Without Information Campaign, By Information Status at Baseline (Index Components)
Notes: Table shows estimated effects on eyeglass ownership and usage relative to the Free Distribution without Information group. Standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at the school level. Conditional usage is estimated using the subsample
owning eyeglasses. Each regression estimated using the subsample indicated above. Corresponding estimates using an index constructed using these variables is shown in Table 7.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
**  Significant at the 5 percent level.
*    Significant at the 10 percent level.
Parents do not believe wearing eyeglasses
harms vision Aware of own myopia status at baseline Does not believe too young for eyeglasses
Does not believe eye exercises can treat
myopiaFamily member wears eyeglasses
Panel B: Informed at baseline
Panel A: Uninformed at baseline
Believes too young for eyeglassesBelieves eye exercises can treat myopiaNo family members wear eyeglassesNot aware of own myopia status atbaseline
Parents believe wearing eyeglasses harms
vision
